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Extreme events and financial system 
governance : some lessons from  
the crisis
Introduction
The consequences of the current financial and economic 
crisis can clearly be described as catastrophic. In the wake 
of losses on risky subprime loans and related structured 
finance products, several financial institutions and with 
them the entire financial system came close to collapse 
and could only be saved by concerted emergency meas-
ures  by  governments  across  the  world.  However,  the 
overall costs of the crisis are huge : most financial institu-
tions have incurred massive losses and shed jobs in large 
numbers. Most economies around the world have slipped 
into recession or their growth has slowed down drasti-
cally. The rescue measures and aid packages that were 
necessary to prevent the banking system from collapsing 
will impose a large burden on governments’ budgets and 
ultimately on taxpayers.
The  catastrophic  consequences  of  the  current  crisis  have 
put tremendous pressure on financial policymakers to take 
measures to minimise the likelihood of such crises in the 
future. In this context, it is important to understand more 
about the nature of crises, or extreme events as they are 
referred  to  in  risk  managers’  parlance,  in  the  financial 
system.  Like  other  catastrophic  events  (such  as  natural 
disasters), an extreme event in the financial system can be 
described as an “event producing a subversion of the order 
or system of things ; a final event, usually of a calamitous 
or disastrous nature”.  (1) It is worth highlighting three more 
specific  characteristics  of  extreme  events  in  the  financial 
system. First, the way they propagate through the finan-
cial  system  depends  on  the  interdependencies  between 
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and behavior of financial institutions. They also often arise 
endogenously from within the system. Second, the prob-
ability of such events is extremely low. That is, the financial 
system  is  able  to  absorb  many  different  imbalances  and 
shocks, but very occasionally a shock or imbalance is too 
large for the system to absorb and the consequences can 
be catastrophic. The extremely low probability also implies 
that there is no market price for the risk of extreme events. 
Third, the overall costs of extreme events can be very high 
and  tend  to  extend  beyond  those  segments  from  which 
they originated.
Bearing  all  this  in  mind,  what  has  gone  wrong  in  the 
financial  system ?  This  article  assesses  two  main  factors 
that may explain how this crisis could have happened. The 
first focuses on the weaknesses of risk models and the 
difficulty to capture the systemic complexities and interde-
pendencies within the financial system. In other words, it 
is hard to measure the probability of extreme events and 
how they play out because they arise endogenously and 
occur  only  very  infrequently.  The  second  factor  relates 
to  the  incentive  of  financial  institutions  to  ensure  their 
resilience to extreme events. Indeed, due to the extremely 
low probability of such events and the low individual costs 
relative to the total costs of a crisis, financial institutions 
have individually little incentive to ensure that they are col-
lectively robust.  (2) In other words, they do not “internalise” 
(1)  Collaborative International Dictionary of English (CIDE).
(2)  This article refers to “investment in robustness” when describing the efforts 
of financial institutions to limit risk-taking and to reduce their vulnerability to 
adverse market conditions. Such efforts might include not relying blindly on 
simplistic models but making decisions based on a deeper and critical risk analysis 
(using “own judgement”). Throughout the article, the expressions “under-
investment in robustness” and “excessive risk-taking’’ are used synonymously.128
the external costs, or negative externality, they impose on 
the system in case of failure.
The analysis of the causes of the crisis will also be useful 
in discussion of the appropriate regulation of the financial 
system. In order to minimise both the risk of individual 
failure and the risk of events of a catastrophic dimension, 
the goal of regulation must be (either by improving incen-
tives or setting rules) to ensure that financial institutions 
invest sufficiently in their robustness and to facilitate a 
proper  appreciation  of  systemic  risk  through  adequate 
modelling.
This  article  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  1  focuses 
on  the  weaknesses  of  risk  management  models  and 
highlights some systemic properties of the financial sys-
tems that have hitherto not been sufficiently addressed. 
Section 2 discusses the question of whether financial insti-
tutions have sufficient incentives to invest in robustness 
and  to  protect  themselves  against  catastrophic  events. 
Section 3 provides some examples of policy proposals that 
aim at reducing the risk of extreme events in the financial 
system. Section 4 concludes.
1.  Modelling risk of extreme events
Many  commentators  blamed  risk  models  for  playing  a 
major role in the crisis. Risk models are supposed to help 
provide  financial  institutions’  decision-makers  with  an 
accurate picture of the risk they face and to guide them in 
making risk-relevant decisions. However, risk models have 
failed in this crisis ; they did not prevent institutions from 
accumulating excessive risk and did not seem to detect 
the  large  amount  of  ‘hidden  risk”  that  loomed  in  the 
financial system before the outbreak of the crisis.
Criticisms of risk models mainly fall into two categories : 
First, the models are vulnerable to “model risk”, as their 
output depends crucially on a series of statistical assump-
tions.  Second,  they  do  not  take  into  account  the  fact 
that risks in the financial system are partly endogenous. 
In other words, models were rather suited to assess the 
short-term  risk  of  a  given  financial  institution  under 
the assumption that fundamental system characteristics 
remain  stable.  Hence,  they  addressed  micro-prudential 
concerns, which focus predominantly on the stability of 
individual institutions.
However, such an approach is not well suited to assess-
ing systemic risk and the risk of catastrophic events in a 
financial system. A top-down approach should be added, 
where  the  assessment  and  modelling  of  risk  is  derived 
from overall system properties. The next sub-section high-
lights the main shortcomings of the models in use. The 
following sub-section discusses some fundamental char-
acteristics of the financial system and how they contrast 
with the current practices for dealing with systemic risk.
1.1    Examples of shortcomings of current risk 
models
With  respect  to  estimating  the  probability  of  extreme 
events, the main shortcomings of the models have been 
the following :
Excessively  short-term  horizon.  Risk  managers  often 
fed  the  models  with  only  relatively  recent  data.  Since 
extreme events occur only very infrequently, such prac-
tices  imply  that  relevant  data  from  previous  extreme 
events tended to be neglected (“short-term memory” or 
“disaster myopia” of risk models). This characteristic also 
makes risk models cyclical, since they become more leni-
ent in boom times when recent data covers periods of low 
risk and default rates.
arbitrary  and  inaccurate  model  assumptions.  Risk 
modellers must make assumptions on statistical distribu-
tion to measure extreme events because they represent 
“tail risk”. In theory, the appropriate statistical distribu-
tions should be selected according to the “fatness” of 
the tail. However, in practice, the fatness of the tail is 
rarely known and hence the choice of probability distri-
bution is prone to errors. Often, risk managers use the 
standard  normal  distribution,  although  this  distribution 
may produce a tail that is not fat enough. Indeed, some 
commentators argue that the systemic nature of extreme 
events in the financial system implies that tail risk is even 
higher than previously thought.(1) The choice of statistical 
distribution has a significant impact on measures such as 
VaR, leading to some degree of arbitrariness of the results 
(see Daníelsson, 2008).
invariant market structure. Another fundamental short-
coming of risk models is their implicit assumption that the 
underlying  market  structure  and  behaviour  of  actors  is 
given and invariant over time. For instance, financial insti-
tutions  insufficiently  considered  the  likelihood  of  other 
institutions  experiencing  the  same  shocks  and  drawing 
similar conclusions, with a further impact on asset prices 
and liquidity. Similarly, widely used methods to estimate 
important inputs in risk models such as default or asset 
price correlations have relied on the assumptions of robust 
relationships over time. For instance, the measurement of 
default correlations by Gaussian copula functions relied  (1)  FSA (2009) ; El-Erian (2008) ; Landau (2008), Haldane (2009), Acemoglu (2009).129
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on past data and therefore implicitly assumed that the 
correlations would remain stable. However, default cor-
relation may vary over time and tend to increase signifi-
cantly in times of stress.
Figure  1  illustrates  the  impact  of  correlation  on  a  loss 
distribution. It depicts the loss distribution of a fictitious 
credit portfolio (credits with default probability of 10% 
and recovery rate of 40%) with two scenarios of differing 
correlations of default probability. In the case of low corre-
lation, the portfolio owner faces relatively small portfolio 
losses most of the time, but the probability of either zero 
or very high portfolio losses is relatively low. In the case of 
perfectly correlated default probabilities, the owner faces 
either zero losses (probability of 90%) or a loss of 60% of 
the portfolio in case of default (probability of 10%). Thus, 
the owner faces very low or very high losses with a rela-
tively high probability. Hence, an incorrect assumption of 
the correlation may lead a risk manager to underestimate 
the magnitude of loss in the case of a severe shock. In 
other words, a portfolio of highly-correlated assets is more 
vulnerable to extreme events. Hence, correctly estimating 
correlation is crucial for risk managers. Prior to the present 
crisis,  risk  managers  dramatically  underestimated  the 
default  correlations  of  certain  structured  finance  assets 
and therefore took on much more systematic risk than 
anticipated.
1.2  Financial systems as complex adaptive systems
In  order  to  improve  modelling  of  systemic  risk  and 
extreme events, it is necessary to understand better how 
a financial system behaves and how it can be made more 
robust.  This  requires  focusing  on  the  overall  systemic 
behaviour rather than just on the behaviour of individual 
institutions. For this purpose, it may be useful to think 
about  financial  systems  in  the  same  way  as  biologists 
or engineers think about systems such as ecosystems or 
complex electricity networks.
Financial systems can be described as “complex adaptive” 
systems.  That  is,  the  system  participants  are  intercon-
nected  in  a  complex  way,  follow  their  own  objectives 
and adapt in an uncoordinated way to changes in the 
environment. A main feature of such systems is that they 
generate  some  specific,  system-wide  outcomes,  which 
cannot be explained by the behaviour of individual insti-
tutions. Thus, the so-called “composition fallacy” applies 
(Landau,  2008).  An  important  implication  is  that  the 
risk of extreme events and how they play out cannot be 
appreciated by looking at individual institutions alone. A 
corollary is that robustness of the system emerges form 
the collective action by financial institutions and cannot 
be engineered (such as in simple systems (e.g. heating 
systems) where behaviour of components can be more 
completely controlled).  (1)
In the long run, a major driving force in the complexity 
and dynamic nature of the financial system is innovation, 
often following from strategies such as regulatory arbi-
trage  by  financial  system  participants.  This  implies  that 
the financial system is constantly evolving, which makes it 
difficult for the institutions or banks themselves to obtain 
a reliable picture of the risk inherent in the system. For 
instance, the initial success of certain structured finance 
products led market participants to believe that the risk 
associated with these products was relatively low. Now, 
those involved have learned that their risk assessments 
were deeply flawed. Regulatory arbitrage also implies that 
regulatory measures may become obsolete and actually 
generate new risks.
In the short run, quick adaptations to changed market 
conditions  also  bear  the  potential  for  unexpected  and 
hard-to-predict  behaviour  of  the  system.  In  fact,  the 
short-term  strategies  used  by  financial  institutions  in 
an extreme event often tend to aggravate the stressed 
market conditions.























CHART 1  THE EFFECT OF CORRELATION ON THE RISK 
PROFILE OF A CREDIT PORTFOLIO 
  (Probability distribution of portfolio losses)
Weakly correlated assets
Perfectly correlated assets
(1)  Kambhu, Weidman and Krishnan (2007)130
1.3    Some properties of financial systems as complex 
adaptive systems
This  section  discusses  some  key  properties  of  financial 
system behaviour. Financial policy-makers ultimately need 
to find ways to take account of these properties, as in 
many cases, financial institutions cannot adequately deal 
with them alone. In other words, a systemic approach to 
regulation is needed.
non-linear  relationships.  In  the  event  of  an  extreme 
event, financial sector stakeholders may abruptly change 
their behaviour, which may result in a regime shift, or a 
“jump”,  to  a  different  equilibrium.  This  leads  to  sharp 
variations in asset prices, correlation between asset prices, 
and volatility. For instance, actors may learn in a crisis that 
their risk assessment was wrong and become extremely 
risk  averse  before  they  can  update  their  assessments 
(flight to quality episodes).  (1)
Also  implied  by  non-linear  relationships  are  multiple 
stable  states  and  path  dependence,  which  play  an 
important  role.  The  former  implies  that  after  a  shock, 
financial institutions may react in a way that locks them 
in a suboptimal market equilibrium from which they are 
unable to move to another equilibrium where they would 
collectively be better off. Path dependence implies that 
the  recovery  path  will  be  a  function  of  the  particular   
conditions  leading  to  the  shock ;  therefore,  the  system 
may look very different even after recovery.
contagion.  In  financial  systems,  losses  incurred  at  a 
single institution or in a certain segment can translate into 
a system-wide crisis by causing funding withdrawals and 
the evaporation of liquidity, ultimately leading to cascad-
ing losses due to asset fire sales. Thus, contagion means 
that shocks which initially hit only one or a few institu-
tions can propagate through larger portions of the system 
through reinforcing feedback loops.
Synchrony. For several reasons, financial institutions may 
fall  into  step  and  make  similar  choices,  akin  to  shoals 
of fish or flocking birds. In the build-up of a bubble, for 
instance, financial institutions often tend to rely on “the 
market”  rather  than  on  their  own  judgement,  thereby 
inflating an asset price bubble even further. More pro-
foundly, the fact that financial institutions use similar risk 
models  may  also  contribute  to  synchronised  behaviour, 
both in the build-up of a bubble and in a crisis, when the 
institutions discover simultaneously that the models are 
flawed. In addition, peer comparison and benchmarking 
as well as decision-making under uncertainty contributes 
to synchronic behaviour.
Box 1  –    The importance of liquidity : maturity mismatch, liquidity risk and 
financial contracting
All financial institutions that act as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers rely on some form of maturity 
transformation. Most notably, banks use withdrawable deposits or short-term funding from other banks to finance 
long-term investments. This maturity mismatch generates liquidity risk, because when lenders demand their money 
back, a financial institution may have to rely on functioning markets (e.g. the interbank market) to roll over their 
debt or to sell some long-term assets to other parties.
Individual decisions...
A  given  financial  institution  will  typically  make  decisions  with  respect  to  the  maturity  mismatch  and  to  the 
management of liquidity risk by relying on some sort of stable structure and relationships in the market place 
(although it will also generally make use of some stress scenarios). Typically, the institution would identify several 
isolated risk scenarios and take appropriate precautionary measures. For instance, the institution may consider 
the scenario where liquidity in the funding market dries up and conclude that it could solve the problem by 
selling assets. Thus, there is the implicit assumption that the funding market and market for the assets are not 
simultaneously hit.
4
(1)  See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Rigotti and Shannon (2005).131
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2.    Limits to individual institutions’ 
incentives to address systemic risk
Financial institutions impose an external cost on overall 
system stability when they go bankrupt and generate a 
severe market dislocation (e.g. by asset fire sales). In this 
respect, it is said that financial institutions will internalise 
such external costs only when they bear fully the systemic 
costs  and  take  them  into  account  when  investing  in 
robustness. In the case of full internalisation of external 
costs,  the  individual  incentives  of  financial  institutions 
would ensure that the system is (i.e. from a social view-
point) robust enough. The relevant questions are thus to 
what extent financial institutions internalise external costs 
and what are the main determinants of the degree of 
internalisation.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that it is 
impossible  to  determine  in  isolation  a  financial  institu-
tion’s incentives to internalise the social costs of failure. 
Financial institutions, like any firm in any market, operate 
in a complex setting where the legal system, regulation 
and other governmental actions, customers and competi-
tors all have an important impact on the degree to which 
external costs are internalised.
2.1    The internalisation of external costs at the firm 
level
Any firm that goes bankrupt will forego future profits and 
so should have incentives to invest in its survival. However, 
financial institutions may lack the incentives to sufficiently 
invest  in  robustness.  Consider,  for  illustration,  the  case 
where there is only one bank serving an economy. When 
considering  investment  in  robustness,  the  bank  would 
undertake a cost-benefit analysis and relate the invest-
ment costs to the future profits it would forego when 
going bankrupt. However, the bank customers and wider 
society benefit from the banking service as well, and so 
would suffer from failure of the bank (this is the external 
cost of a bank failure). Ultimately, the degree to which 
the  bank  internalises  these  external  costs  depends  on 
whether customers can “price in” the value they derive 
from ongoing bank services (demanding higher interest 
rates if the bank is less robust) and thereby can induce the 
bank to invest appropriately in robustness.  (1)
In a world with multiple banks and asymmetric informa-
tion, considerations with respect to product differentia-
tion, market positioning and reputation potentially have 
a  powerful  impact  on  financial  institutions’  incentives 
to  invest  in  robustness.  Such  considerations  broadly 
impact on the conditions under which parties are willing 
to deal with a given financial institution. They also tend 
to be effective in the long run and hence might provide 
...may imply a fragile overall system
Liquidity-related decisions by credit institutions, although rational and prudent at the individual level, may in 
aggregate lead to a fragile financial system. For instance, Hellwig (1995) has provided a theoretical example in 
which banks have only modest maturity mismatches, but the overall maturity mismatch of the financial system, as 
generated by the chain of financial institutions, represents systemic risk. Hence, individual institutions may fail to 
incorporate systemic risk into the choice of their maturity mismatch. 
Likewise, the system-wide dimension of shocks is generally not sufficiently appreciated by financial institutions. 
Liquidity shocks tend to affect several institutions simultaneously and may have contagious effects. For instance, 
market rumours about the solvency of a bank may make it harder for this bank to re-finance itself and force 
it to sell off assets. However, market participants may worry that banks with a similar structure have the same 
problem and refuse to re-finance these banks as well. This creates a simultaneous sell-off of these banks’ assets 
which tends to depress the market price (fire-sale asset prices), further aggravating the situation of the banks in 
question and other institutions that have similar assets. Hence, the liquidity problem of one bank spreads to other 
banks and ultimately becomes a solvency problem. Thus, from a systemic perspective, there is a concern that 
liquidity evaporates across several market segments with potentially catastrophic consequences (e.g. evaporation 
of liquidity in the interbank lending market). Financial institutions have generally considered liquidity risk only in 
an isolated manner and have failed to take into account the systemic dimension.
(1)  See Kim et al (2005) for an example of how borrowers may discipline banks to 
avoid losses and thereby to increase their robustness.132
incentives to financial institutions to ensure their resilience 
to very infrequent extreme events.
However, this may not always be true. Indeed, in a highly 
competitive  environment,  financial  institutions  may  not 
be able to afford to invest sufficiently in robustness, if this 
increases their cost base and implies that they cannot take 
on some desired risk. Concerns about (short- / medium-
term) performance may thus weigh more than the consid-
eration related to the remote probability of failure.
In addition, the fact that EEs in financial markets hit many 
institutions at the same time may also reduce incentives 
to invest in robustness, because the damage to reputation 
is likely to be lower when peers suffer similar problems. 
This is in contrast to other industries, where contagion 
effects are more limited and catastrophic events tend to 
hit a particular firm, but not the whole industry (e.g. a 
pharmaceutical firm that markets a new drug which turns 
out to have deadly side effects does not trigger a chain 
effect on its competitors).
In  brief,  one  can  conclude  that  financial  institutions 
internalise the external costs associated with catastrophic 
risk only to a limited degree. This is due to frictions and 
transaction  costs  in  markets  and  the  financial  system 
which prevent the different parties from “pricing in” the 
external costs.
2.2    The internalisation of external costs at the 
intra-firm level (corporate governance and 
stakeholders’ incentives)
This section opens the black box of a financial institu-
tion and considers the organisational structure and the 
role of differing stakeholders, or corporate governance. 
Financial institutions must balance the interests and objec-
tives of different groups. Typically, the various groups, or 
stakeholders, have incentives and objectives that follow 
from the structure of their claim and the pay-off func-
tion they face. Most importantly, the stakeholders who 
are in control in normal times – the shareholders and the 
managers – usually have incentives that are biased toward 
excessive risk-taking compared to the other stakeholders.
Risk-shifting incentives of shareholders. Shareholders 
have an asymmetric pay-off function because they profit 
fully from the “upside” of increased risk-taking but are 
partially  protected  from  the  downside  due  to  limited 
liability (debt holders and depositors face the remainder 
of  the  “downside”).  Hence,  shareholders  have  a  pay-
off structure that resembles a long call option, and they 
tend to take on too much risk. Specifically, shareholders 
have insufficient incentives to deal with extreme events 
because they do not internalise the costs of such events, 
either to depositors and debt holders or to the financial 
system. Thus, the internalisation problem with respect to 
extreme events is aggravated in the case of shareholder 
control.
manager incentives. The incentives of the managers and 
other risk-takers in financial institutions are partly defined 
by  the  remuneration  scheme  and  broader  career  con-
cerns (e.g. reputation and labour market opportunities). 
Remuneration  schemes  have  often  been  tilted  towards 
short-run gains. Moreover, remuneration cannot be nega-
tive,  which  implies  that  managers  have  a  long  call-like 
pay-off function similar to that of shareholders. Moreover, 
job  market  opportunities  may  also  favour  short-term 
behaviour. In boom periods, managers who boost their 
institution’s profits can increase their own “market value” 
significantly.  In  general,  the  time  horizon  of  managers 
tends to be much shorter than the frequency with which 
extreme events occur, dampening the incentives to take 
precautions.
(implicit) guarantees by authorities and third parties. 
Financial  institutions  and  their  stakeholders  also  enjoy 
explicit or implicit guarantees that provide incentives to 
disregard the “downside” of risky strategies. For instance, 
the implicit backing of a government in the event of fail-
ure may reduce institutions’ incentives to invest in robust-
ness. A government faces the fundamental problem of 
not being able to credibly commit itself to not bailing out 
financial institutions. In addition, even in a crisis, a govern-
ment may need to rely on the knowledge and skills of the 
existing management and may consequently be unable to 
adequately “punish” them (Acemoglu, 2009).
As an example of the importance of intra-firm incentives, 
consider the current debate on the shortcomings of the 
corporate  governance  of  large  banks  as  listed  public 
companies.  More  specifically,  the  concern  is  about  the 
shareholder-value  orientation  and  the  shortcomings  of 
executive pay. Commentators (from business, academia 
and the regulatory sphere) often argue that other corpo-
rate governance forms, such as partnerships, would pro-
vide better incentives for the decision-makers with respect 
to risk-taking.  (1) The debate is far from over, but suggests 
that corporate governance plays an important role for the 
incentives to invest in robustness.
(1)  See Wired Magazine (2009) ; Glassman and Nolan (2009) ; Knowledge@Wharton 
(2009) ; Financial Times (2009) ; Wharton School (2005).133
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3.  Policy examples
Financial  policy-makers  around  the  world  are  currently 
proposing  a  wide  range  of  regulatory  and  supervisory 
measures  to  restore  the  normal  functioning  of  the 
financial  system.  Note,  however,  that  policymakers  are 
constrained in the choice of measures. Feasible measures 
include those that target the business model (e.g. permis-
sion to open branches), the legal or the organizational 
form  of  financial  institutions  and  quantitative/nominal 
restrictions (e.g. capital requirements or limits on growth 
rates). This section presents some specific examples and 
discusses  how  they  can  improve  risk  modelling  and / or 
incentives, in order to reduce the likelihood of extreme 
events in the future.
3.1  Macro-prudential supervision
The possible realisation of an extreme event demonstrates 
that the prudential control framework needs to rest on 
two complementary pillars : a powerful micro-prudential 
function  focusing  on  the  stability  of  individual  institu-
tions but also a strong macro-prudential function, con-
centrating on systemic stability. Indeed, the fundamental 
characteristic of a macro-prudential approach is to take a 
Box 2  –    The importance of liquidity : maturity mismatch, liquidity risk and 
financial contracting (continued)
Considering the systemic relevance of the design of financial structure and claims (i.e. the maturity mismatch 
and short-term nature of funding), what are financial institutions’ incentives to choose an appropriate design for 
financial contracts ? 
Financial contracting and liquidity risks
Basically, financial contracting must take into account asymmetric information and the resulting potential for 
adverse behaviour of contracting parties. As a solution, liquidation threats can play an important role as a discipline 
device in the design of financial claims. For instance, the fragility of financial institutions through the nature of 
demandable debt (deposits) may be considered to be a direct response to alleviating the agency problems of 
banks. The capital structure determines their fragility due to the liquidation threat and is therefore a device with 
which to discipline managers (see Calomiris and Kahn, 1991 ; Diamond, 1984). Fragility of banks may also fulfil 
other roles, such as providing a commitment device for bank managers to provide liquidity (Diamond and Rajan, 
2000, 2001). Other examples of liquidation/withdrawal threats are investors in their role as limited partners in 
partnerships (e.g. hedge funds – see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) ; and prime brokers who may withdraw their 
funding from traders / hedge funds. Thus, withdrawal threats are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they 
are a valuable disciplining device for managing  agency problems in financial contracting. On the other hand, they 
give rise to systemic fragility and channels of contagion.
Incentives for proper liquidity management
In addition, the question of the incentives for financial institutions to appropriately manage liquidity risk surfaces. 
Maintaining a high level of liquid assets is costly for financial institutions (more liquid assets allow for a greater 
degree of freedom and hence are more expensive than illiquid assets – see Jones and Ostroy, 1984), but liquidity 
turns out to be very valuable in an extreme event where many asset classes except the more standard and 
robust ones are becoming illiquid. Hence, there may be a concern that some financial institutions under-invest in 
liquidity. Similarly, financial institutions’ business model decisions may also reflect insufficient incentives to invest in 
robustness. Take the case of institutions like Northern Rock or Hypo Real Estate (HRE), which relied almost entirely 
on wholesale funding (and issuance in the covered bond market) and were highly dependent on liquidity in these 
markets.134
system-wide view with respect to the distribution of risk in 
the financial system, both at a given point in time (cross-
sectional  distribution)  and  over  time  (pro-cyclicality).  In 
addition, the micro- and macro-prudential control func-
tions are not only complementary but they also reinforce 
each other. Macro-prudential analysis allows micro-pru-
dential supervisors to better identify possible weaknesses 
of individual banks. Conversely, macro-prudential analysis 
can not be undertaken in isolation and should rest on 
micro-prudential data and close contacts with the supervi-
sors. For this reason, it is very important for the supervi-
sory architecture to foster strong and regular interactions 
between those involved in micro- and macro-prudential 
supervision.
In  this  respect,  the  recent  de  Larosière  Report  makes 
some important proposals.  (1) First, the report calls for the 
creation of a European System Risk Council (ESRC) under 
the auspices of the European Central Bank. The objective 
of the ESRC – which could be compared to a “systemic 
risk supervisor” – would be to improve macro-prudential 
supervision  in  Europe.  In  addition  to  the  ESRC,  the  de 
Larosière  Report  recommends  establishing  a  European 
System  of  Financial  Supervisors  (ESFS).  This  framework 
will further foster co-operation between micro and macro 
prudential  authorities.  Finally,  the  report  also  calls  for 
more important role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in tracking and controlling systemic risk. Specifically, 
the IMF should operate a global financial stability early 
warning system to track systemic risk and should support 
efforts of the international community to deal with juris-
dictions with weak regulatory standard.
3.2  System robustness
One of the properties of a complex adaptive system is 
that not all nodes in the system have equal importance 
for  the  stability  of  the  system,  since  some  systemically 
important players will endogenously develop. Therefore, 
the  concern  of  macro-prudential  authorities  on  robust-
ness of the system also implies that they should be able 
to assess and include the impact of these players on the 
robustness of the system in their analysis. Similarly, the 
nature  of  complex  adaptive  systems  suggests  that  all 
systemically  important  institutions  should  be  subject  to 
micro-prudential  control,  and  this  holds  independently 
of their legal form or activities. As a consequence, the 
perimeter of the regulatory and supervisory framework 
should be based at least in part on the significance of 
financial institutions for the robustness of the system. In 
other words, the question of whether a given institution 
should be regulated (and how) should not only depend 
on the legal structure or institutional form, but also on 
its systemic importance. In this respect, market observers 
have raised some specific issues :
the “shadow” banking system. In recent years, unregu-
lated financial institutions such as hedge funds, private 
equity firms or structured finance vehicles, have gained 
significant importance in the financial system. Structured 
finance  vehicles  contributed  significantly  to  the  crisis. 
Although they allowed large banks to seemingly unload 
credit risk, they were also plagued by the same vulne-
rabilities as regulated institutions, namely a high maturity 
mismatch, high leverage and hence liquidity risk.
Hedge funds have also gained in importance, and it is 
still not clear whether they have contributed to the actual 
crisis.  They  have  become  significant  players  in  many 
market segments and tend to be highly leveraged, which 
implies that they can potentially cause or amplify severe 
shocks. Moreover, their activities are highly opaque, which 
makes external risk assessment very difficult. Hence, regu-
latory efforts have been undertaken to improve transpar-
ency  and  “indirect  regulation”,  with  the  aim  of  better 
assessing risk concentration in the system and ensuring 
that counterparties do not provide excessive leverage to 
hedge funds. Discussion of regulation of hedge funds is 
also ongoing.
Systemically  important  institutions.  Some  market 
observers  have  also  contemplated  the  introduction  of 
special measures for systemically important credit institu-
tions. One idea is to estimate measures of systemic risks 
for groups of institutions and then calculating the con-
tribution of each institution to systemic risk. Systemically 
important institutions – which would be defined as those 
which contribute significantly to system-wide risk – might 
then  be  subject  to  special  regulation.  However,  it  may 
be  quite  difficult  to  make  a  clear  delineation  between 
systemically unimportant and systemically important insti-
tutions. Also, institutions may be individually insignificant 
but,  collectively,  systemically  important  (consider  for 
instance the failure of the savings and loan associations in 
the US the associated crisis in the 1980’s).
3.3  Pro-cyclicality
The dynamic and cyclical nature of the financial system 
has  been  the  source  of  a  great  deal  of  attention  by 
policymakers,  especially  as  risk  models  –  together  with 
regulation based on these models – may have contrib-
uted to pro-cyclical behaviour ; i.e., to a situation where 
(1)  The report is available at :  
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/statement_20090225_en.pdf135
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the cyclical behaviour of financial institutions accentuates 
business  cycles  in  the  economy.  At  this  stage,  several 
proposals have been brought forward for dampening pro-
cyclical behaviour in the financial system and / or for weak-
ening the pro-cyclical effects of existing regulation. The 
proposed measures focus mainly on three areas : reducing 
the excessive cyclicality of capital requirements, introduc-
ing loan loss provisions and constraining and limiting the 
pro-cyclical effect of leverage and valuation.  (1)
Indeed, measures targeted at reducing pro-cyclicality may 
contribute  to  a  better  macro-prudential  governance  of 
systemic  risk  and  also  address  the  incentive  problems. 
Most extreme events in the financial system arise through 
the bursting of a bubble and are thus the result of collec-
tive overshooting behaviour (herding) of financial system 
participants.
If adequately designed, such measures may reduce the 
accumulation of systemic risk in the system. However, it 
is not yet clear whether such measures can be efficiently 
designed and whether they will be effective in preventing 
the accumulation of risk over time.
3.4    Introducing a central clearing party in 
CDS markets
Market infrastructure is also likely to play a role in the 
way in which financial institutions are able to internalize 
systemic risk. For instance, credit default swaps (CDS) are 
currently traded over the counter (OTC). OTC trading is 
inherently opaque and prone to operational and counter-
party risk. As a consequence, counterparties trading CDS 
over the counter do not internalize the externalities of 
their bilateral agreements on other parties. Specifically, by 
selling credit default protection to a given party, the seller 
increases the counterparty risk to other parties which have 
previously purchased credit protection from this seller and 
whose contracts are still outstanding.
Policy makers are going to introduce a central clearing 
party (CCP) in the CDS market. A central clearing party 
will eliminate counterparty risks for the individual parties 
and allow for a more efficient governance of risk by net-
ting the various bilateral contracts. Note, however, that 
the  central  clearing  party  must  be  robust.  Otherwise, 
instead of counterparty risk, other risks stemming from 
a single-point-of-failure may arise. However, supervisors 
of financial infrastructure have experience in dealing with 
such risks from which regulators can benefit.
3.5    Improving corporate governance and incentives
As discussed above, the governance structure of financial 
institutions and their remuneration practices can have a 
strong impact on the risk taking incentives of the institu-
tion. In the current policy discussion, reforming remunera-
tion schemes in large financial institutions is high on the 
agenda.  (2) This is surely an important aspect of improving 
incentives, as this will shift the incentives of risk-takers 
within financial institutions towards long-term perform-
ance, internalizing to a better degree the externalities of 
systemic risk. Besides the structure of the remuneration 
scheme, other features of governance are likely to influ-
ence  incentives  and  therefore  deserve  a  careful  assess-
ment.  For  instance,  the  composition  of  the  supervisory 
board, the role of shareholders, and the position of risk 
managers  in  the  corporate  hierarchy  are  all  important 
determinants of the incentives of (publicly traded) finan-
cial institutions to invest in robustness.
Business model decisions and the choice of the corporate 
governance structure will also impact on the external costs 
that a failure of an institution imposes on the system. In 
this respect, policymakers may want to push institutions 
to organize their major business units as separate legal 
entities to facilitate the liquidation or sale of units in case 
of failure of the institution.
Conclusion
This article explores some of the factors that can underlie 
a build-up of risk in financial institutions and the system. 
One  factor  relates  to  the  shortcomings  of  risk  models 
and, in particular, the absence of a systemic dimension 
which would reflect the complexities and interdependen-
cies  within  the  financial  system  and  the  impact  of  the 
institutions’ own behaviour on the system. Another factor 
concerns the inadequate incentives that financial institu-
tions  have  to  invest  in  preventing  extreme  events.  The 
failure of an individual financial institution can have an 
impact on the entire financial system ; however, financial 
institutions  do  not  “internalise”  the  negative  external 
costs they impose on other financial system participants 
and the wider economy when making decisions related 
to their robustness.
The extreme event which we have experienced in recent 
months has confirmed that a sound supervisory frame-
work should rest on two strong pillars : namely the micro- 
and  macro-prudential  supervision.  Authorities  should 
therefore continue to invest in their prudential regulatory 
framework  in  order  to  further  strengthen  the  super-
vision of overall system robustness (i.e. macro-prudential 
(1)  See Financial Stability Forum (2009).
(2)  See the article “Reforming remuneration schemes in the financial industry : some 
governance and implementation issues” in this FSR.136
supervision) as well as the supervision of individual finan-
cial  institutions  (micro-prudential  supervision).  In  this 
respect, the recent de Larosière report recommends the 
creation  of  the  European  System  Risk  Council  (ESRC) 
and the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). 
This  framework  will  further  foster  strong  and  regular 
interactions between those performing micro- and macro-
prudential analyses.
Several  other  regulatory  proposals  will  also  contribute 
to  an  increase  in  robustness  of  the  financial  system. 
Proposals  to  introduce  central  clearing  parties  in  CDS 
markets, to regulate the “shadow” banking system (e.g. 
hedge  funds),  and  to  apply  specific  measures  to  sys-
temically important institutions reflect concerns about the 
cross-sectional distribution of systemic risk in the financial 
system. Proposals aimed at reducing the pro-cyclicality of 
behaviour of financial institutions address both the incen-
tive problem and concerns about the time-dimension of 
systemic risk. Proposals for improving corporate govern-
ance aim at incentives to invest in robustness.
In conclusion, achieving robustness in the financial system 
is a complex task. For this, policymakers need a frame-
work that not only focuses on risks related to individual 
institutions and continuously monitors systemic risk but 
that is also able to improve the regulation and incentive 
for individual institutions such that they operate in a way 
that contributes to the robustness of the financial system.137
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